Trends in Process Control Systems Security by Miller, Ann K.
Missouri University of Science and Technology 
Scholars' Mine 
Electrical and Computer Engineering Faculty 
Research & Creative Works Electrical and Computer Engineering 
01 Jan 2005 
Trends in Process Control Systems Security 
Ann K. Miller 
Missouri University of Science and Technology 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarsmine.mst.edu/ele_comeng_facwork 
 Part of the Electrical and Computer Engineering Commons 
Recommended Citation 
A. K. Miller, "Trends in Process Control Systems Security," IEEE Security and Privacy Magazine, Institute of 
Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE), Jan 2005. 
The definitive version is available at https://doi.org/10.1109/MSP.2005.136 
This Article - Journal is brought to you for free and open access by Scholars' Mine. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Electrical and Computer Engineering Faculty Research & Creative Works by an authorized administrator 
of Scholars' Mine. This work is protected by U. S. Copyright Law. Unauthorized use including reproduction for 
redistribution requires the permission of the copyright holder. For more information, please contact 
scholarsmine@mst.edu. 
On the Horizon
Editor: O. Sami Saydjari, ssaydjari@cyberdefenseagency.com
welfare. They also support industry
and government operation. Within
the US alone, critical infrastructures
include approximately 28,600 net-
worked Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (FDIC) institutions, 2
million miles of pipeline, 2,800
power plants (with 300,000 produc-
tion sites), 104 nuclear power plants,
80,000 dams, 60,000 chemical plants,
87,000 food-processing plants, and
1,600 water-treatment plants. 
In an effort to scope the issue, the
US National Strategy for Homeland
Security has identified 14 areas for
critical infrastructure protection,
most of which are privately owned:
agriculture, information and tele-
communications, food energy,
water, transportation, public health,
finance and banking, emergency
services, chemical industry and haz-
ardous materials, government, postal
and shipping, defense industrial
base, and national monuments and
icons. At the heart and soul of nearly
every one of these critical infrastruc-
tures is a process control system. PCSs
have existed for millennia: float reg-
ulator mechanisms for controlling
water levels, for example, date back
to Greece circa 300 BC. In the 1800s
and early 1900s, most control sys-
tems used relay and sequencer tech-
nologies; the most significant recent
development was the introduction
of programmable logic controllers
(PLCs) in the late 1960s. 
This article explores the recent
evolution of PCSs and their envi-
ronments, explains the need for im-
proved security in these systems, and
describes some of the emerging re-




A PCS frequently used in critical in-
frastructures and factory automa-
tion is a supervisory, control, and
data acquisition (SCADA) system,
which monitors switches and
valves, controls temperature and
pressure conditions, and collects and
logs field data. A SCADA system
can continuously record and report
pressure data polled from an oil
pipeline, for example; if an alarm is
registered, the control-room opera-
tor can respond to the alarm and use
the system to investigate other parts
of the pipeline. SCADA systems also
monitor pipelines for total volumet-
ric rate, to provide yield data. Addi-
tionally, these systems can sample
the produced fluids for specific
gravity, gas composition, and other
physical parameters as required.
SCADA systems typically monitor
and report these values to control-
room operators. 
SCADA systems specifically, and
PCSs in general, have tiers of com-
puting capability—from powerful
workstations to PLCs to wired and
wireless sensors—with all the com-
ponents networked together to pro-
vide the desired process control.
Such systems’ operational require-
ments vary by industry and applica-
tion, but most requirements
typically include 24/7 availability,
real-time or near-real-time re-
sponse, and, increasingly, remote
control. In terms of security primi-
tives, security professionals typically
prioritize by confidentiality, in-
tegrity, and availability. For a PCS,
though, it’s availability, availability,
and availability: when you flip a light
switch, you expect the light to turn
on, and when you pick up a tele-
phone, you expect a dial tone. In
some sectors, estimates of the cost of
downtime  range from US$1 million
to $4 million per hour or US$25
million to $100 million per day.
Designers typically build PCSs
with fault-tolerant techniques such
as redundancy and minimal mean
time to repair, paying special atten-
tion to disaster recovery. For most
systems, harsh environments (such as
the North Sea and the Gulf of Mex-
ico for deep-sea wells) and natural
disasters (such as hurricanes and
earthquakes) pose the biggest
threats. The 1988 Piper Alpha ex-
plosion of an oil production plat-
form in the North Sea, for example,
resulted in 167 deaths and substantial
financial losses. Since then, many oil
pipelines have been fitted with
emergency shutdown valves de-
signed to close the pipeline at two or
more places in the event of major





he protection of critical infrastructure systems is a
hotly debated topic. The very label “critical infra-
structure” implies that these systems are important,
and they are: they support our everyday lives, from
the water and food in our homes to our physical and financial
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loss at one end. Many countries also
mandate regulatory oversight and
institute certification requirements
for new oil and gas wells. But why
isn’t the threat of computer attack
addressed equally?
To answer this question, we must
first look at the evolution of PCSs
and the environment in which they
operate. Initially, PCS data commu-
nication relied on proprietary proto-
cols and operating systems, but over
time, standard Ethernet-based pro-
tocols offered several additional ad-
vantages: less training, increased
overall productivity, and reduced
costs. However, the flipside of this
standardization is an increased vul-
nerability to Ethernet-based attacks.
Furthermore, many PCS products
now include commercial off-the-
shelf software—for example, com-
mercial operating systems and
database packages. This computing
environment promotes ease of use,
but it also renders PCSs susceptible
to myriad buffer-overflow vulnera-
bilities and other attack opportuni-
ties inherent in products such as
Microsoft Windows. Connectivity
has also significantly increased.
Whereas human operators initially
worked within the PCS’s “blast
zone” with its stand-alone network,
safety considerations have encour-
aged the use of remote control and
management, and a growing num-
ber of companies now control their
SCADA systems from offsite. Oil
production companies use remotely
controlled pipeline-isolation plugs,
for example, to seal pipelines for
planned shutdowns (routine repairs),
rerouting, adding valves, and so on.
Figure 1 illustrates a typical example,
with PLCs and remote terminal
units (RTUs) monitoring and con-
trolling specific offshore infrastruc-
ture elements.1
SCADA systems, with various
communication links for redun-
dancy and control-center manage-
ment software, perform the system
monitoring between field and con-
trol centers. Communication links
can traverse the public Internet, thus
the threat space is literally the world.
Even in less hostile environ-
ments, such as manufacturing lines,
the PCS is frequently on its own
subnetwork with connectivity to the
rest of the enterprise (see Figure 2).2
The advantage is that the organiza-
tion has access to production-line
output in real time, but the disadvan-
tage is the potential for access by
disgruntled employees within the
organization and malicious outsiders
via the Internet.
System security
Many studies have analyzed individ-
ual SCADA systems for reliability and
security,1,3,4 but it’s still an important
research area simply because its assets
are so critical. Several specific areas are
still ripe for further research.
Vulnerability assessments
and decision support
The number, speed, and sophistica-
tion of network attacks continue to
grow; naturally, this dynamic, yet es-
calating, threat environment re-
quires a comprehensive approach to
security that also includes vulnera-
bility and risk analyses. Many vul-
nerability assessments are just results
of a checklist’s completion; they
offer no assurance that the list is
comprehensive or that the PCS,
once it “passes the checklist,” is now
secure. We need a systematic
methodology that can apply to a va-
riety of SCADA systems. Some ini-
tial work in this area has begun,5 but
much more is needed. Moreover,
these critical systems are large and
complex, which makes changes and
upgrades costly. Once we can iden-
tify and assess the vulnerabilities,
we’ll need a decision support system
to prioritize various strategies for




A PCS’s networked nature is one of
its greatest strengths because it pro-
vides the opportunity for robustness,
while also allowing the possibility of
cascading failures. One of a critical
infrastructure’s most vulnerable lay-
ers is network access to its SCADA
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Figure 1. Supervisory, control, and data acquisition (SCADA) system for an oil platform
with increasing use of remote control and connectivity to the rest of the enterprise.









































systems. To understand a dynamic
network architecture, we need tools
that facilitate network mapping—
tools that not only visualize node
topology and connectivity but also
provide information on types of
reachability as well as path depen-
dence. In hardware, reachability can
be as simple as a link at the physical
layer and (in system terms) whether a
route allows a path to the system or
network. In software, reachability
can include the operating system or
program’s ability to make the neces-
sary connections to the hardware or
network to “reach” the system.
Whether done directly through
routing or via a series of handoffs,
reachability opens vulnerabilities.
The research needed in this area is
more than a ping utility; automated
network analyses that can run in
background mode and provide
warnings if a security policy is vio-
lated would greatly assist SCADA
operations. Tool support through an
analysis of information flow be-
tween SCADA systems is also
needed—system security personnel
might want to restrict certain types
of packets in support of the organi-
zation’s security policy and not per-
mit any “backdoor” mechanism for
those packets through indirect rout-
ing. Tools such as the prototype
Cayenne Network Analyzer are a
step in this direction.6
Infrastructures and their collec-
tive PCSs are often interdepen-
dent—the power grid, for example,
depends on oil and gas pipelines,
and oil and gas pipelines depend on
the power grid. Yet such systems’
vulnerabilities aren’t obvious; an at-
tack on one infrastructure can cause
a failure in a seemingly unrelated
infrastructure. Moreover, each in-
frastructure is composed of multi-
ple layers, from cyber to physical
system control; thus, a cyberattack
in one infrastructure could cause a
physical failure in another. Visual-
ization tools could help operators




A PCS’s tiered structure requires a
multilayered model that can capture
identified vulnerabilities. Further-
more, to link the vulnerabilities be-
tween interdependent systems, the
modeler requires some notion of
causality. Once developed, the mod-
eler could link the resulting
multilayered SCADA models to de-
termine system interactions, and then
test, refine, and validate these models
and data through increasingly sophis-
ticated experiments to discover and
record additional dependencies and
system interactions. Network con-
gestion control also has room for im-
provement. Promising work is under
way at the US National Infrastructure
for Simulation and Analysis Center
(NISAC; www.lanl.gov/orgs/d/nis
ac/) in its development of the Inter-
dependent Energy Infrastructure
Simulation System (IEISS) tool and
the Water Infrastructure Simulation
Environment (WISE).
Distributed control
PCSs are naturally distributed, but
monitoring and control are often
centralized, and controllability is
limited to operations centers. With
the advent of intelligent distributed
www.computer.org/security/ ■ IEEE SECURITY & PRIVACY 59
Figure 2. Process control system (PCS) network for a manufacturing line. Frequently,
networks are located in isolated facilities with connectivity to the enterprise and,
ultimately, to the Internet through one or more firewalls.3 (HMI stands for human-
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controllers, the rise in distributed
decision-making via network com-
munication has broadened the avail-
able responses to infrastructure
changes due to natural failures or at-
tack. However, controllers’ actions
must be cooperative so that they
don’t introduce negative network
effects on the system. Distributed al-
gorithms govern these actions, so
they must also be fault-tolerant and
secure. Many PCSs are, in reality,
transportation networks; thus, flow
models and flow-balance algorithms
dominate the controllers. These al-
gorithms can be made fault-tolerant
via executable runtime assertion-
checking. The distributed coordina-
tion algorithms for a specific type of
controller for power systems, the




A recent survey analyzed cyberattack
incident reports collected from vari-
ous infrastructure control systems.8
The study showed a fivefold increase
from 1994 to 2004 in the annual
control system incident rate. An-
other significant finding was a
change in the type of incident. For
the period between 1982 and 2001,
29 percent of the incidents were la-
beled as external, 50 percent as acci-
dental, and 21 percent as internal.
However, from 2002 to 2004, 66
percent were classified as external, 22
percent were accidental, and only 3
percent were internal; the remaining
were categorized as unknown. We
need improved techniques for deal-
ing with network attacks across the
entire spectrum, from real-time indi-
cations and pre-attack warnings to
trans-attack methods for survivabil-
ity, denial, and consequence man-
agement to post-attack means for
attribution through digital forensics.
W ith so many PCSs in privatehands, there is a very real reluc-
tance to discuss vulnerabilities, but
the sharing of information is essen-
tial. One group aims to ease this fear:
the Process Control Systems Forum,
www.pcsforum.org. Although the
forum is a US Department of
Homeland Security initiative
launched in May 2005, it recognizes
that PCS security is a global issue that
requires a global solution, and inter-
national membership is invited and
encouraged. This open forum has
several subgroups, called interest
groups; one particular such group fo-
cuses on research. The Research In-
terest Group will maintain an open,
shared, and well-publicized Web site
(www.pcsf.org) to serve as a reposi-
tory for control systems research
(with links to references and related
sites), raise awareness of control sys-
tems issues where further research is
needed, and encourage dialogue and
collaboration between industry,
academia, and government. 
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